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the wing participated (excluding locally generated exercises). (S)

Date	Exercise	Hours Flown/CPI		
15 July 16 July 19 July 14 Aug 16 Aug 29 Aug 13 Sep 20-25 Sep 15-21 Oct 13 Dec	Razors Edge (Tac Eval) Max Bombing (Tac Eval) Exercise Kingpin Razors Edge (Tac Eval) Exercise Kingpin Front Center II/Max effort Front Center II A Fallex/High Heels 62 Marne Rock Quick Train/Fast Strike	68:00 63:00 26:00 80:00 23:00 77:00 CPX CPX 52:25 CPX	(s)	
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The flying time breakdown for operational and administrative flying during the period July through December 1962 was as follows: (S)

Month	F-100	<u>T-33</u>	<u>c-47</u>	<u>L-20</u>	
July August September October November December	2036 2102 1958 1628 1479 1589	236 257 351 282 229 260	103 134 110 151 116 70	82 山 29 31 19 <u>30</u>	
TOTAL:	10792	1615	584	235	(S)

During the Cuban crisis, early October through 15 November, the Seventeenth Air Force increased the wing target commitment by 14 targets with two additional on Victor Alert. Squadron pilots were placed on a moderately restrictive standby status and aircraft were held on the ground in an operational status, thereby sharply reducing the flying training program temporarily. Subsequent intensified flying assured the successful completion of all flying requirements by the tactical squadrons by early December. (S)

During its October inspection the Seventeenth Air Force inspectors noted that wing aircraft in the Automatic Program were being configured to three or four tanks at the end of flying each day. This was done to place the aircraft in a better posture to meet reaction time. However, it necessitated considerable downloading because this configuration, in the majority of cases, was not compatible with that required or desired for training purposes. The team recommended that a 2 x 450 tank configuration, as opposed to four tank configuration, be adopted by the wing, thus eliminating practically all configuration changes for both reaction times and training purposes. Accordingly, wing aircraft were modified to facilitate the 2 x 450 gallon external tank configuration. The configuration was employed on a limited number of sorties flown during December to check the compatibility of flight characteristics with wing training mission requirements and to educate air and ground crews. (S)

Materiel. Despite serious deficiencies the Aircraft Maintenance Division provided the capability to support over 10,000 F-100 tactical flying hours and approximately 2,500 support aircraft flying hours during the six-month period. The average O/R rate for F-100 aircraft during the period was 75 percent. Approximately 29 direct manhours per one F-100 flying hour and 14.2 direct manhours per one T-33 aircraft flying hour were expended by personnel of the aircraft maintenance

(SECRET) There was a no notice tactical evaluation of the 20th conducted 15-17 July 1962. The initiation message was received by the 20th shortly after noon on

Sunday and the Wing did experience more than normal difficulty in recalling personnel. The Commander and his key staff were readily available and reacted rapidly. Though

the 20th TFW appeared to be completing their automatic program within specified time limits, two (2) problem targets near the end of the program caused the scheduling of 7aircraft to cover these targets. The 20 TFW did not demonstrate their ability to meet the satisfactory reactions required by 17 AF NSP and were therefore rated

unsatisfactory. There were many contributing factors involved in this rating, however, the principle reason was the inability to meet launch requirements. DCO discrepancies were of a minor nature with the exception of VADO launch procedures in the 79 TFS. Action was immediately taken to correct this and all other discrepancies.

(SECRET) There was a repeat no-notice tactical evaluation of the Wing on 14 Aug 62 due to the unsatisfactory rating received in the 15 - 17 July Tac Eval. Recall problems were not experienced although a general alert was announced at 05053. In spite of additional discrepancies noted the overall improvement in the 20TFW in the

four (4) weeks between tactical evaluations was marked. This was evidenced by the Wing bettering its own LSP by over an hour. Accordingly the Wing was awarded a satisfactory rating.

(UNCLASSIFIED) July and August were primarily spent in preparing for Exercise Max Effort " (29 Aug) a new concept in exercise gaming. Most exercises ignore the possibility or effects of an enemy attack on this base. Max Effort was based on the assumption that a "Near Miss" nuclear attack had destroyed approximately 50% of our

launch capability. The blast created three (3) zones of damage - heavy, medium, and light. Instructions in the plan were used to determine casualties and damage according to the location in a particular zone. A Staff of approximately 50 umpires selected from base organizations worked under the direction of the Project Officers

to develop damage problems for each facility, and piece of equipment. These were distributed after the blast. Casualty Description Cards and Armbands were used to tag dead and wounded. The dead were segregated from the living to demonstrate the effect such a tremendous loss of personnel would have on our launch capability.

"Living" personnel were fed the noon and supper meals at a mess tent rather than in the mess hall. Umpires were kept busy observing and recording the actions of various organizations in coping with the large losses of personnel and equipment while trying

to recover from the attack and launch aircraft. The Line 1000 Reporting System was also used for the first time. This system combined most APEX and all SS form reports into one that could be transmitted "in the clear" thus speeding up reports. Teletype traffic was reduced almost 50%. The report also included a Commanders estimate of his Launch capability based on consolidated staff estimates of the elements non-essential to launch - materiel medical, munitions, personnel communications, radiological,

security, facilities and services. Any limiting factor affecting launch and assistance required was also included. After the initial difficulties of using a new system the Line 1000 reporting method met with very favorable acceptance by all concerned. (UNCLASSIFIED) The month of September saw the Air Force Tactical Aircraft Gunnery Meet, "William Tell '62". The 20TFW was represented by Major Frederick S. Roselius with Captain James W. Harrison, Jr. as alternate competitor. Under the new competition concept each Wing is represented by one competitor only, with a back-up in case of emergencies. Major Roselius and Capt. Harrison, along with other USAFE F-100 Competitors flew their own aircraft to and from the meet, a feat not attempted by

PACAF and the USAFE F-105 Wings. Major Roselins at was only able to finish 10th out of the 14 competing Wings. NARRATIVE (Continued) the the 55th Squadron continued to maintain & drons at RAF Wattisham. They have attended (UNCLASSIFIED) During this six (6) .ld and in return have invited members of the

close relationship with the fract several of our parties here (

was only able to finish 10th out of the 14 competing Wings.

(UNCLASSIFIED) During this six (6) months the 55th Squadron continued to maintain a close relationship with the fighter squadrons at RAF Wattisham. They have attended several of our parties here at Wethersfield and in return have invited members of the 55th to their squadron functions.

(SECRET) During July 62, 17 AF increased the 20TFW target commitment by three targets. No change in VA targets. On 15 August 62, 17 AF increased our target commitment by nine (9) targets and increased the VA Force by two (2) aircraft. These targets were assumed as a result of the inability of 17 AF assigned F-105 units to maintain an operational ready state due to aircraft mechanical problems. On 24 Sep 62 the F-105's became operationally ready again and re-assumed their targets, thereby reducing our commitment by 10 targets and deleting the two additional VA targets, However, they incorporated Armed Strike Reconnissance and Contingencies into the Regional Priority

Program. This change levied a requirement for Bomb Commanders to memorize in some instance: 5 seperate targets (Two squadron targets, primary and alternate, plus a VA target with the possibility of contingency 2 targets.)

(SECRET) During the Cuban crisis, early October through 15 Nov., 17 AF increased the 20th target commitment by 14 targets with two additional on VA. Squadron pilots were placed on a moderately restrictive standby status and aircraft were held on the ground in an operational status thereby sharply reducing the flying training program temporarily. Subsequent intensified flying assured the successful completion of all flying requirements by the Tactical Squadrons by early December.

(UNCLASSIFIED) Management training: During this period three classes were conducted graduating a total of thirty-seven students. Military Suggestion Program: A total of 384 Military Suggestions were received to which 69 were adopted, realizing a first years savings of \$44,364.41. The 20th Tactical Fighter Wing maintained fourth position in the USAFE Military Suggestion Contest. Unit Manning Document Actions: Unit Manning Document actions resulted in the realignment of spaces throughout the Wing.

This was due to the standardization of F-100 Tactical Fighter Wings to conform to the Dual Deputy Concept of organization. In addition the following deletions were made to our UMD. LWR CIVILIANS OFFICERS AIRMEN

(SECRET) The recent modification of all Wing aircraft to facilitate the 2 x 450 Gal. external tank configuration has resulted in a study of the undue workload imposed by the incompatibility of eircraft configurations required for training purposes as opposed to wartime requirements. Mission planning criteria, coordination with higher Headquarters and the possibility of the USAFE wide procurement of 335 gal. tanks will

be considered and a decision is expected in Jan 63. In the meantime, we are using the 2 x 450 tank configuration on a limited number of sorties during December to check flight characteristics for our various training missions and to educate air and ground crews. Continue Narrative on Page 4 HAME, GRADE AND SERIAL NUMBER OF COMMANDER SIGNATURE OF COMMANDER DATE ...

(Security Classification)